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The number of Chinese applications for patents and trademarks has drastically increased 
over the past ten years.1 This increase in filings can be at least partially attributed to subsidy 
programs offered to domestic applicants by the Chinese government.2 These subsidies, offered 
for both foreign and domestic intellectual property (“IP”) acquisitions, may have significant 
consequences internationally.3 This paper asserts that by backing these initiatives, China violates 
the national treatment principles of the TRIPS Agreement and ignores its obligations under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.4 Rather than expending their own 
resources in attempting to solve the problems posed by the subsidized filings, World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) members should seek to enforce these international agreements and 
curtail China’s continued violations. 
II. PATENT SUBSIDIES 
 In 2019, China filed the most international patent applications out of any other country in 
the world.5 In doing so, China ended the US’s streak of being the biggest user of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty’s (PCT) international patent filing system since its inception in 1978.6 
Similarly, as of 2019, China was the fourth largest user of the US patent system.7 Even more 
                                                          
ǂ Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2021. For biographical information, see: 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/taylorstemler/. I would like to thank Renee Kraft for providing the inspiration to write 
on this topic and for all of her thoughtful feedback and guidance on this article. I would also like to thank the 
Cybaris Law Review team for all their help editing. All errors are my own.  
1 See infra Parts II and III. 
2 Id. 
3 See infra Sections II.A and III.A. 
4 See infra Part IV. 
5 China Becomes Top Filer of International Patents in 2019 Amid Robust Growth for WIPO’s IP Services, Treaties 
and Finances, WIPO (April 7, 2020) [hereinafter China Becomes Top Filer], 
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2020/article_0005.html#:~:text=With%2058%2C990%20applications%
20filed%20in,PCT%20began%20operations%20in%201978 [https://perma.cc/MM2T-B3XS].  
6 Id.  
7 The number of Chinese patent filings in the US came in just behind the US, Japan, and South Korea. See USPTO, 
Patent Counts by Origin and Type, CALENDAR YEAR 2019[hereinafter PATENT COUNTS BY ORIGIN 2019], 




staggering is the dramatic rate of increase in Chinese filings at the USPTO, up 93% over the 
previous 10 years.8 Although China has experienced a significant period of technological growth 
over the past decade,9 one major factor to which the increase in Chinese patent filings has been 
attributed is its patent subsidy program.10  
A. Overview of China’s Current and Former Patent Subsidy Program 
 The number of patent applications filed and granted by a country has historically been 
used as a metric for gauging that country’s level of innovation.11 Although on its face, measuring 
patenting activity would appear to be a logical way of gauging innovation, these measurements 
can be distorted by other incentives driving parties to increase patent filings. One other incentive 
may include, for example, signaling a company’s value to potential investors when seeking to 
secure financing, as owning a large patent portfolio can provide an aura of legitimacy, regardless 
of the strength of the constituent patents.12 Governments may also wish to increase the amounts 
of patent held by domestic entities for similar reasons. Increased patent activity within or from a 
country may signal to others that the country is a hotbed of innovation, spurring an increase in 
foreign direct investment.13  
                                                          
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/st_co_19.htm [https://perma.cc/T3JD-HHQX] (last visited May 
27, 2021).  
8 In 2009, 1,654 US patent applications originated from the People’s Republic of China. See USPTO, Patent Counts 
by Country, State, and Year - Utility Patents, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_utl.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T7SB-JQUB] (last visited May 27, 2021). In 2019, this number rose to 22,962. PATENT COUNTS 
BY ORIGIN 2019, supra note 7.   
9 Briony Harris, China Is an Innovation Superpower. This Is Why, WORLD ECON. F. (2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/these-charts-show-how-china-is-becoming-an-innovation-superpower/ 
[https://perma.cc/EJ95-UF4Z]. 
10 USPTO, TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA 3 (2021) [hereinafter TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA]. 
11 K. Pavitt, Patent Statistics as Indicators of Innovative Activities: Possibilities and Problems, 7 SCIENTOMETRICS 
77, 77 (1985).  
12 Doug Robinson, 10 Reasons to Patent Your Startup’s New Invention, STARTUPNATION (Feb. 5, 2020),  
https://startupnation.com/manage-your-business/patent-new-invention/ [https://perma.cc/8ZQY-X3NQ].  
13 Foreign direct investment is generally attracted through developing strong domestic technological capacity and IP 
rights. Given how technological capacity has historically been measured using patent filing activity, it is likely that 
an increase in patent filing within a country would signal an increase in technological activity and foreign direct 
investment. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, (Ctr. for Int’l Econ. 
Stud., Policy Discussion Paper No. 0022, 2000), 




 To increase the number of patents held by domestic entities, China has created new 
incentives to file patent applications in China and the rest of the world. Among the incentives are 
reduced prison sentences,14 tax breaks,15 patent commercialization subsidies,16 individual 
housing benefits,17 application filing and examination subsidies,18 and subsidy awards for 
granted patents.19  
Patent application and grant subsidies, the focus of this section, were first developed in 
the late 1990s and have been launched in other provinces in China throughout the early 2000s.20 
Given that each Chinese province is responsible for its own patent promotion and enforcement,21 
the amounts of, and eligibility requirements for the subsidies vary by province. In some cases, 
the subsidies cover the entire filing or examination fee for a given application.22 According to the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (“the USPTO”), many of the subsidies even provide financial 
incentives greater than the cost of obtaining the patent itself.23  
                                                          
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_Foreign_Direc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XSC5-BV6Z]. 
14 Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Prisoners in China Can Get Out of Jail in Exchange for Patents, GIZMODO 
(February 2, 2015), https://gizmodo.com/prisoners-in-china-can-get-out-of-jail-early-by-patent-1683159871 
[https://perma.cc/J3RX-TACM]. 
15 Patent Subsidies to Boost R&D, AFD CHINA (2016) [hereinafter Patent Subsidies to Boost R&D], 
https://www.afdip.com/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=2557 [https://perma.cc/TQ9X-ERUG]. 
16 Id. 
17 Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2010/10/14/patents-yes-ideas-maybe [https://perma.cc/8EQS-9N23].   
18 Patent Subsidies to Boost R&D, supra note 15.  
19 Id. Interestingly, many of the Chinese patent subsidies mirror those provided by the Soviet Union for inventors 
certificates under the Act Concerning Inventions and Technical Improvements. Among other things, the Soviet 
incentives included access to priority accommodations, schools, and research positions. See Francis Hughes, Soviet 
Invention Awards, 55 ECON. J. 291, 291–292 (1945).  
20 Jianwei Dang & Kazuyuki Motohashi, Patent Statistics: A Good Indicator for Innovation in China? Patent 
Subsidy Program Impacts on Patent Quality, 35 CHINA ECON. REV., 137, 140 (2015).  
21 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended and promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong.) (Dec. 27, 2008), art. 22, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn028en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BDQ-QYJD] [hereinafter Patent Law of China].  
22 Id.  
23 TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 7.  




For example, in Beijing, applicants could earn as much as 20 million yuan ($3 million 
USD) in foreign patent subsidies in a given year. Interestingly, the per patent subsidy for an 
applicant seeking a foreign patent, 50,000 yuan ($7,500 USD) is significantly higher than the 
1,000 yuan ($150 USD) subsidy offered to an applicant seeking a domestic, Chinese patent.24 
Not only do Chinese cities offer attractive subsidies to applicants, but certain sub-city districts 
also offer additional monetary subsidies to applicants that can be combined with the city level 
subsidies.  
Generally, to be eligible for a subsidy, the applicant must be either an enterprise, public 
institution, governmental organization, or social organization registered within the city offering 
the subsidy.25 Thus, to qualify for a subsidy, the patent application must be owned by a Chinese 
entity.26 If the application is later assigned to a non-Chinese entity, the entire subsidy may be 
revoked or required to be repaid.27 
 Recently, the Chinese National IP Administration (“CNIPA”) announced a plan to cancel 
or phase out all patent subsidies.28 This change in policy was said to be an attempt to curb the 
improper filing behavior of Chinese applicants and encourage the filing of higher quality 
patents.29 The announcement requires that all funding for patent application filing and 
                                                          
24 Id. Although the cost of obtaining a US patent (about $7,500 USD) is significantly higher than that of a Chinese 
patent (about $950 USD), the discrepancy between the subsidies is far from proportional to the difference in costs of 
patent acquisition between the two countries. See How Much Does a Patent Cost in Major Countries?, GREYB 
(2020), https://www.greyb.com/patent-cost/ [https://perma.cc/DYU3-DK8L]. 
25 Haijun Jin, Yuli Tu & Shutong Wang, Government-Backed Patent Funds in China, 2013 TECH MONITOR 24, 25.  
26 Jeremy Kriegel, Strategies to Leverage Chinese Patent Subsidies, INTELL. PROP. MAG. 78, 79 (2012).  
27 Id.  
28 Guójiā Zhīshì Chǎnquán Jú Guānyú Jìnyībù Yángé Guīfàn Zhuānlì Shēnqǐng Xíngwéi De Tōngzhī (国家知识产
权局关于进一步严格规范专利申请行为的通知) [Notice of the State Intellectual Property Office on Further 
Strictly Regulating Patent Application Behavior], (promulgated by the China Nat’l Intell. Prop. Admin., Jan. 27, 
2021), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2021/1/27/art_545_156433.html?xxgkhide=1 [https://perma.cc/25SZ-9UHW].   
29 China to Cancel All Patent Subsidies, XINHUANET (Feb. 5, 2021), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-
02/05/c_139724293.htm#:~:text=5%20(Xinhua)%20%2D%2D%20China%20plans,intellectual%20property%20(IP
)%20services [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-ZXMS]. 




prosecution activities by Chinese provinces and the CNIPA be halted by June of 2021.30 
Although provinces are still permitted to provide subsidies for granted patents until 2025, these 
subsidies must not exceed 50% of the official fees paid in obtaining the patent right.31 
Importantly, the notice does not apply to sub-provincial local IP departments and is not directed 
to state agencies other than the CNIPA.32 Thus, these other entities may be free to continue 
disbursing patent subsidies despite the proposed change in policy.33  
B. Effects of the Chinese Patent Subsidy Program 
 The USPTO has suggested that the Chinese subsidy programs have contributed to a 
decrease in the commercial value of Chinese national patents.34 In doing so, the USPTO cites the 
proportionately low rate at which domestic Chinese national patent recipients file for 
international patent protection.35 In the US, 80% of US national patent applicants file for 
international protection.36 Comparatively, 5% of Chinese national patent applicants seek 
international protection.37 From this data, the USPTO concludes that Chinese applicants may 
recognize the minimal value of the patent, which would provide only a minor return on 
investment.38 When considered with the fact that many Chinese patent subsidies for international 
filings are contingent upon the granting of the international patent, it may be that Chinese 
applicants are skeptical about the likelihood acquiring a patent right. This could be due to a 
                                                          
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 Mark Cohen, CNIPA’s Notice on Cancelling Patent Subsidies: A Deeper Dive, CHINA IPR,  (February 15, 2021), 
https://chinaipr.com/2021/02/15/cnipas-notice-on-cancelling-patent-subsidies-a-deeper-dive/ 
[https://perma.cc/NV5G-FYL7].  
33 Id.  
34 TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 10.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. It is important to consider, however, that despite the relatively low percentage of Chinese national applicants 
filing internationally, China is still the number one user of the PCT. China Becomes Top Filer, supra note 5. 
37 Id. at 10.  
38 Id.  




recognition that the discovery relates to an insignificant technical advancement or because of 
prior difficulties seeking protection abroad when compared to experiences at Chinese patent 
office.39 However, the USPTO’s conclusion that Chinese patents are less valuable merely 
because of the low rate of international filing could overlook the fact that much of the market for 
Chinese innovation may be domestic.40 Domestic applicants may just recognize the lack of 
incentive to file abroad since so much of their market is located within China.41 Therefore, using 
the international filing rate as a value metric for Chinese patenting may be problematic.  
 A likely more direct measure of the value of subsidy-driven Chinese patents is their 
successful commercialization.42 Here, the USPTO notes that China lags behind other countries, 
as the WIPO 2020 Global Innovation Index ranks China 44th in the measure of IP receipts as a 
percentage of total trade.43 Thus, the USPTO concludes that despite having received more 
national patent applications than all other offices in the IP5 combined,44 the licensing revenue 
generated from these patents is underwhelming compared to the other offices in the IP5.45 
Although licensing may be a useful indicator, basing the value of Chinese patents solely off of 
these numbers could overlook the fact that licensing is a relatively sophisticated medium of 
patent commercialization. As a developing country, Chinese patentees may have yet to fully 
appreciate the value in licensing their patent rights. The WIPO 2020 Global Innovation Index 
ranks China fifth in high-tech net exports as a percentage of total trade.46 Thus, China appears 
                                                          
39 Deli Yang, Pendency and Grant Ratios of Invention Patents: A Comparative Study of the US and China, 37 RSCH. 
POL’Y, 1035, 1035 (2008).  
40 Hong, Y., The Major Innovations of Chinese Economic Development Theories in the New Era, 1 CHINA 
POLITICAL ECON. 13, 15–16 (2018). 
41 Id. at 16. 
42 TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 10. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. at 3 n.2.  
45 WIPO, GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2020 239, 256, 272, 312, 337, 339 (2020) (ranking Japan and the US at 1st, 
the United Kingdom at 8th, Germany at 17th, Korea at 18th, and China at 44th).  
46 Id. at 239. 




able to extract value from its patents in ways other than licensing them, which could undermine 
the USPTO’s suggestion that they are of poor quality. Still, regardless of what method of 
valuation is used, researchers seem to agree that after enacting the subsidies, Chinese patent 
quality has not kept up with the surge in patent filings.47 
 Another effect of the patent subsidies is that firms may be splitting up inventions into 
more patent applications.48 Thus, when provided financial subsidies per application, firms 
choose to file patents in an inefficient manner. In doing so, firms waste both administrative 
patent office and firm resources while their innovation rate remains relatively unchanged. 49 
 Finally, increased domestic patenting may have a defensive effect internationally. Many 
companies possess a certain amount of institutional knowledge that may not rise to the level of a 
“patent worthy” discovery. Companies choose to forego patenting for various reasons. For 
instance, if the discovery would be difficult to commercialize, companies may decide that the 
return on investment in seeking patent protection is insufficient to recover the costs of seeking a 
patent in the first place.50 In this case, it may be economical for the firm to forego patenting or 
try protecting the advance as a trade secret. If, however, the costs of obtaining patent protection 
were lessened, or eliminated completely, companies may be more inclined to seek patent 
protection over these types of discoveries.   
 Generally, undisclosed, private information cannot be used to invalidate or serve as a bar 
to obtaining patent rights.51 This is because the information is not known to the public.52 If then, 
                                                          
47 See generally Dan Prud’homme, Chinese Patent Quantity and Patent Quality, and the Role of the State, in 
EVALUATION OF CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME FOR INNOVATION (2017). 
48 Zhen Lei, Zhen Sun, & Brian Wright, Are Chinese Patent Applications Politically Driven? 21 (2013 Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Paper), https://www.oecd.org/site/stipatents/4-3-Lei-Sun-
Wright.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR4M-73FC]. 
49 Id. at 22.  
50 See supra, note 39 and accompanying text.  
51 See PATENT LAW OF CHINA, supra note 21, art. 22. 
52 Id. 




Chinese entity A opted to forego patenting a discovery while failing to make a public disclosure, 
and entity B attempted to obtain a Chinese patent on that discovery, Chinese entity A may be 
unable to prevent entity B from doing so.53   
The above hypothetical may prove problematic in the eyes of some institutions, such as 
the Chinese government, where entity B is a foreign enterprise. Patent protection allows one to 
obtain monopoly profits from a market.54 Generally, a domestic patent holder is more likely to 
reinvest its monopoly profits within its domestic country instead of reinvesting other foreign 
countries.55 Conversely, a foreign patentee is more likely to reinvest more of these profits in a 
foreign country.56 Thus, generally speaking, granting patents to a foreign entity may result in that 
entity extracting monopoly profits from the granting country using the patent right, and 
reinvesting these profits overseas.57  
 In another hypothetical, if Chinese entity A were to instead have gotten a patent on the 
discovery that it might have otherwise chosen not to disclose, entity B would be foreclosed from 
obtaining a Chinese patent on the discovery.58 At the same time, entity A’s Chinese patent would 
serve as worldwide prior art.59 Because of this prior art affect, entity B may also face difficulty 
patenting this discovery in another foreign country.60 Thus, Chinese entity A would hold an 
                                                          
53 However, entity A would likely still be allowed to use the patented technology as a prior user. See PATENT LAW 
OF CHINA, supra note 21, art. 69. 
54 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 195-99 (2d ed. 1977). 
55 See Carl R. Moy, History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 475 (1993).  
56 See Id.  
57 See FRITZE MALCHUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, PATENT STUDY NO. 15 OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE 55, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1958). 
58 PATENT LAW OF CHINA, supra note 21, art. 22.  
59 What is Prior Art?, EUR. PATENT OFF. (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.epo.org/learning/materials/inventors-
handbook/novelty/prior-art.html [https://perma.cc/73LE-ZDGB]. 
60 Whether a foreign patent office is likely to cite a Chinese patent application as prior art during prosecution is 
another story. Still, in most countries, the Chinese patent application could serve as invalidating prior art to a foreign 
patentee seeking to assert their rights in the invention. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL/REGIONAL PATENT LAWS, 
WIPO (2020).  




exclusive monopoly in the Chinese market, thereby preventing the situation where a foreign 
entity exports monopoly profits from the Chinese market. Meanwhile, entity A retains its ability 
to compete in the foreign market, thereby ensuring that Chinese entity A has the opportunity to 
export profits from the foreign marketplace back to China.  
 Evidence of this theory’s application in the development of the Chinese subsidy policy is 
lacking, and it is unlikely that this defensive effect served as a major goal behind enacting the 
subsidies. However, at least one study has found evidence of Chinese protectionism in the 
prosecution of patents in China, it was careful to note that this effect only appeared in 
technological areas of strategic importance.61 Considering these findings, it’s at least plausible 
that China may be interested in restricting the growth of foreign patenting, at least in some 
technological areas. This paper does not suggest that the Chinese subsidies are the sole, or even a 
major cause of any fluctuations in rate of patents granted to foreign applicants. Nor does it 
suggest that these policies have even been effective in restricting foreign patenting. Still, based 
on the theoretical considerations outlined above it’s possible that they have some incremental 
effect. To be sure, China does have an incentive to roll back the subsidies to focus applicants on 
increasing patent quality.62 Still, because of the theoretical potential protectionist effect, China 
may also have an incentive to re-institute or halt the additional the elimination of these programs. 
This is because, by incentivizing domestic patenting by Chinese entities, China may effectively 
decrease the likelihood of monopoly profits being exporting by foreign patent holders while 
increasing the likelihood of imported profits from Chinese firms competing abroad.  
                                                          
61 Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Emilio Raiteri, Technology Protectionism and the Patent System: Evidence from China 
29 (Innovation and Intell. Prop. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 11, 2020),  
62 Paolo Beconcini & Elisa Li, New Procedures Indicate China’s Patent System is Now Focused on Quality, not 
Quantity, of Patents, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.iptechblog.com/2021/02/new-
procedures-indicate-chinas-patent-system-is-now-focused-on-quality-not-quantity-of-patents/ 
[https://perma.cc/RVE9-6D2B] (noting that this change in policy was said to be an attempt to curb the improper 
filing behavior of Chinese applicants and encourage the filing of higher quality patents), 




III. TRADEMARK SUBSIDIES 
 Chinese trademark subsidies are just as troubling, if not more, than its patent subsidies. 
The increase in the number of trademark applications filed in China is staggering, with China’s 
trademark office recording 92% more trademark applications in 2018 than the US, the next 
leading office.63 Not only have these subsidies contributed to an explosion in the number of 
trademark applications filed by Chinese applicants in China,64 but they have also yielded a large 
uptick in the amount of Chinese filings in the US. While US national filings from domestic 
applicants doubled between 2008 and 2018, US filings submitted by Chinese applicants 
increased thirty-one fold during that same period.65 In 2020, the number of Chinese trademark 
applicants surpassed US applicants at the USPTO for the first time.66  
A. Overview of China’s Current and Former Trademark Subsidy Program 
Since at least the mid-2000s, China has maintained a subsidy program to incentivize 
applicants to secure trademark protection both in China and abroad.67 As of 2021, localities 
within China have adopted over 70 trademark subsidy measures.68 The USPTO continues to 
caution that China is increasing its incentives for Chinese entities registering trademarks 
abroad.69  
                                                          
63 WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2019 90 (2019). When adjusted for population, the 
statistics are only slightly less striking, with China recording 62% more trademark applications. Id. 
64 Id. The vast majority of applicants were residents of China. Id.  
65 Compare WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2010 86 (2010), with id. at 96.  
66 Bridget Diakun, China Overtakes American Brand Owners to be Largest Source of Trademark Applications at the 
USPTO, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/ip-offices/china-
overtakes-american-brand-owners-be-largest-sources-of-trademark-applications-the-uspto-data-analysis 
[https://perma.cc/UTC9-4MBN]. 
67 World Trade Organization, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 
25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Doc. G/SCM/N/95/CHN/Suppl.1, 98–99 
(2016).  
68 TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 3.  
69 Id. n.11.  




 In many instances, Chinese trademark subsidies outweigh the costs of filing a trademark 
application in the US. For example, in 2013, Shenzhen Province in China authorized subsidies 
for filing trademarks internationally.70 Eligibility for these subsidies generally depends on 
residence or corporate registration within the city granting the subsidy.71 In Shenzhen, the 
amount of the subsidy varies depending on where in the world the trademark application is being 
filed.72 For applications registered in the U.S., an applicant is awarded RMB 5,000 (about $760 
USD). Meanwhile, as of 2015, the cost to file a trademark application with the USPTO has 
hovered around $250.73 Thus, under subsidy programs like the one in Shenzhen, it becomes 
economically rational for a Chinese entity to file for trademark rights in the US even if they have 
no intention of using the mark.74 
 As of 2019, Shenzhen Municipal Administration for Market Regulation announced that it 
would be lowering its subsidies available for applicants filing in the U.S. and other foreign 
countries to RMB 1,000 (approximately $150 USD).75 Likewise, in January of 2020, the CNIPA 
                                                          
70 Shēnzhèn Shì Shìchǎng Jiāndū Guǎnlǐ Jú Guānyú Yìnfā Shēnzhèn Shì Zhīshì Chǎnquán Zhuānxiàng Zījīn Guǎnlǐ 
Bànfǎ——Zhuānlì Shēnqǐng Zīzhù Děng Bā Gè Cāozuò Guīchéng De Tōngzhī (深圳市市场监督管理局关于印发
深圳市知识产权专项资金管理办法——专利申请资助等八个操作规程的通知) Intell. Prop. Prot. Ctr., Oct. 13, 
2014) [hereinafter Shenzhen Patent Application Funding], art. 12, 
http://www.sziprs.org.cn/zcfg_65898/xgzc_70319/201410/t20141013_2595113.htm [https://perma.cc/V2NP-PVC8] 
[notice of the Shenzhen Municipal Administration of Market Supervision on the Issuance of the Shenzhen 
Municipal Intellectual Property Special Fund Management Measures-Eight Operating Procedures including Patent 
Application Funding] (promulgated by China (Shenzhen)). 
71 Id. art. 2. In some instances, foreign companies appear able to register their company in Shenzhen, in which case, 
it may be possible for a foreign company to be granted a subsidy. Bobby Lee, The Process of Registering a WFOE 
in Shenzhen, HONGDA (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.hongdaservice.com/blog/the-process-of-registering-a-wfoe-in-
shenzhen [https://perma.cc/V4SK-X47W]. 
72 Josh Gerben, Massive Wave of Fraudulent US Trademark Filings Likely Caused by Chinese Government 
Payments, GERBEN, https://www.gerbenlaw.com/blog/chinese-business-subsidies-linked-to-fraudulent-trademark-
filings/ [https://perma.cc/TF9M-NCUT]. Interestingly, trademark subsidies range from RMB 10,000 per registration 
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announced a plan to clean up, and in some instances eliminate, subsidies for IP. However, just a 
few months later, the Chinese government directed its state-owned enterprises to increase their 
international filings by 50%.76 In stating this goal, China cited the need to promote innovation 
and creativity.77 To meet these goals, Chinese subnational governments will need to continue to 
increase the availability of subsidies and other non-market incentives.78  
 As an aside, regardless of how Chinese subsidies for trademark applications are handled 
in the future, the incentive for Chinese applicants to file US trademark applications in the US 
may remain unchanged. Amazon, almost a government in its own right, now provides 
preferential treatment to sellers who can demonstrate proof of a registered trademark.79 For many 
sellers who sell inexpensive everyday objects, building a brand is unimportant to the success of 
their operation.80 Thus, all that matters to these sellers is to secure a registered trademark that 
they can submit to Amazon and use to gain admission into its preferred Brand Registry 
program.81 Given that nearly half of Amazon’s top sellers are based in China,82 and that many of 
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these Chinese sellers thrive in low-cost market, it is possible that this increase in Chinese 
applications is here to stay.  
B. Effects of the Chinese Trademark Subsidy Program  
 It is difficult to say exactly how much of the increase in Chinese trademark applications 
in the US is attributable to Chinese subsidies or the seller incentives provided by Amazon.83 For 
the purposes of this paper, no attempt will be made to parse out the effects attributable to one 
incentive or the other. Rather, the effects of the increase in Chinese filings will be examined 
more generally under the assumption that both incentives contribute to this phenomenon. 
 With this huge increase in demand for US trademarks by Chinese applicants, some 
attorneys have carved out a specialty in serving these clients.84 However, although it keeps US 
attorneys employed, this influx in Chinese applications may prove problematic for the US 
trademark system. Some of the Chinese applications merely seek to protect random strings of 
English character letters that have nothing to do with the goods or services with which they are 
applied for.85  In other cases, applicants seek protection over random combinations of English 
language words. Often, these marks are successfully registered, as US trademark law recognizes 
marks that have nothing to do with the goods with which they are classified, as fanciful or 
arbitrary.86 Fanciful and arbitrary marks are especially strong and are typically easier to register 
than other marks that are suggestive or descriptive of the products with which they relate.87 
 The US requires actual use, or an intent to use the mark before one is entitled to register a 
trademark. Many trademark users opt to plan ahead and secure registration on an intent to use 
                                                          
83 McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 1805–⁠06.  
84 Diakun, supra note 67. The leading attorney representing Chinese clients before the USPTO filed 9,922 trademark 
applications in 2020, which equates to more than 27 applications per day. Id. 
85 McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 1804. 
86 Id. at 1811. 
87 See Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO. L.J. 731, 753–54 (2017). 




basis, as it this allows them to secure priority over their mark early on. The applicant is then later 
required to submit proof of their use of the mark. This is typically done by submitting a photo to 
the USPTO, which is called a “specimen.” Alternatively, if one is already using the mark, they 
can apply for trademark protection with a use-based application, in which they can submit a 
specimen with their application.  
In many cases, Chinese applicants fraudulently claim use of the mark based on doctored 
specimens submitted to the USPTO.88 For example, the same picture of a pair of shoes with a 
photoshopped tag sporting the candidate mark could be reused for multiple different trademark 
applications.89 Interestingly, almost always, these fraudulent specimens are submitted with 
marks registered in conjunction with apparel goods or scientific instruments on a use-based 
application.90 One study has found that 66.9% of these use-based applications for apparel goods 
included fraudulent specimens, of which 38.9% proceeded to be registered by the USPTO.91  
Once these applications are registered by the USPTO, the applicant can then apply for Chinese 
subsidies or seek admission to Amazon’s Brand Registry program.  
This large influx of fraudulent marks imposes serious administrative burdens on the 
USPTO.92 The surge in filings has significantly bogged down trademark examiners and has 
caused the USPTO to look into increasing their hiring.93 It is unclear how these applications will 
impact the USPTO in the long term, as much of the USPTO’s budgeting is based on the 
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expectation that owners will renew their marks and pay additional fees.94 In the likely case that 
many of these marks go unrenewed, this could lead to a significant gap in the USPTO budget.95  
These fraudulent marks also harm US trademark stakeholders. The massive influx of 
bogus Chinese trademark applications exacerbate the problem of trademark depletion, which 
creates obstacles for those attempting to register and use legitimate trademarks.96 Trademark law 
rests on the assumption that there is an unlimited supply of potential trademarks.97 However, 
quite the opposite is true.98 Nearly all the words that Americans use on a daily basis are now 
registered or are confusingly similar to a registered mark.99 Because of this, new applicants are 
forced to seek longer, more complex, and less effective marks.100 As more fraudulent marks are 
registered, this issue of trademark depletion continues to worsen as the number of viable 
trademarks continues to decrease.101 
Furthermore, to protect their existing trademark rights, US trademark owners must 
enforce their marks against later infringers. A failure to do so could result in the erosion of the 
trademark holder’s trademark rights.102 Many trademark owners use monitoring services to look 
out for any confusingly similar marks that new applicants are seeking to register.103 Once an 
application for a confusingly similar mark is filed, the owner must then oppose the mark or run 
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the risk of the new applicant impinging the owner’s rights. These proceedings to oppose marks 
can be expensive, especially when they become more frequent due to the large number of 
fraudulent applicants.104 Thus, companies seeking to maintain their rights are forced to expend 
significant resources doing so. This may also serve to diminish the perceived value in owning a 
US trademark as these rights become more expensive and difficult to maintain. 
Partly in reaction to the negative effects of this influx of Chinese registrations, the 
USPTO sought to combat the issue by requiring foreign applicants to engage US attorneys and 
provide an email address for each application.105 Still, likely because of the willingness of US 
attorneys to serve this massive demand,106 along with the ease of obtaining an email address, 
Chinese filings continued to increase.107 In December 2020, the US enacted the Trademark 
Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”).108 The TMA called for the USPTO to implement 
procedures to allow third parties to challenge pending applications and suspicious 
registrations.109 Although the TMA does equip parties to challenge certain applications or 
registrations, it still requires trademark owners to expend their own resources doing so and lacks 
any means of prospectively addressing the large influx of Chinese applications.110  
Others have proposed prospective solutions for how the USPTO ought to address this 
issue. One solution is to institute a trademark bar, similar to the USPTO’s patent bar, where 
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practitioners must register with the USPTO to practice in front of the office.111 Doing so could 
make it easier for the USPTO to crack down on practitioners who file trademark applications for 
clients who submit fraudulent specimens.112 This would likely put some of the onus on 
practitioners to scrutinize the filing and would filter out some of the most egregious 
applications.113  
Another suggestion is to enlist a specialized examining unit trained to spot and flag 
fraudulent applications.114 Similar measures have been taken in the cannabis space, where the 
USPTO maintains a specialized unit of examining attorneys assigned to handle cannabis related 
filings.115 This unit seeks to assist applicants in registering trademarks for cannabis related 
products, while not allowing registration of marks for federally illegal cannabis itself.116  Like 
the cannabis examining unit, a specialized fraud detection unit could be trained to handle risky 
applications and detect fraudulent specimens.117 One possibility here is to assign all incoming 
Chinese applications to this specialized unit. Ironically, however, doing so would likely violate 
international treaties like the TRIPS Agreement—the very same agreement which this paper 
argues some of the Chinese subsidies violate.118 A more viable solution would be to assign this 
unit all incoming use-based trademark applications in the apparel or scientific instrument 
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classifications. Given that most of the fraudulent applications appear in this category, it seems 
likely that such an approach could screen out most of these problem applications.    
Finally, other suggestions include gathering more information about foreign applicants’ 
eligibility for government subsidies, requiring the USPTO to make a more in-depth inquiry about 
applicants’ use in commerce, or provide an incentive (or subsidy) for successful challenges or 
marks at the USPTO.119 One commentor even suggests mobilizing US law school IP clinics to 
challenge specious trademark claims using the third-party opposition system created by the 
TMA.120 While potentially effective, all of the approaches above require additional effort and 
expense for US shareholders or the US government. Therefore, a more efficient approach to 
addressing issues caused by the Chinese subsidies may be to challenge the subsidies themselves, 
rather than the individual applications they help create.  
IV. TREATMENT OF CHINESE SUBSIDIES UNDER WTO TRADE RULES 
A. Overview of Relevant International Agreements and the National Treatment Principle  
One of the most important international agreements in existence is the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).121 Originally implemented in 1948, the GATT is the 
foundation for many other multilateral trade agreements.122 The GATT generally applies to 
international regulations pertaining to trade in goods.123 One of the basic principles that each 
country agrees to in signing onto the GATT is the principle of national treatment.124 Under this 
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principle, in the context of international trade, member countries are not permitted to tax, 
regulate, or enact other laws which afford protection to domestic products.125 The national 
treatment rule endorsed by the GATT is, however, limited by several enumerated exceptions.126 
Among the specific exceptions is that “[t]he provisions of this Article shall not prevent the 
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers . . . .”127 The reason for this exception is 
said to be a recognition of subsidies as an important governmental policy tool.128  
Still, in recognition that subsidies may have a negative impact on trade, the WTO 
member countries enacted an additional Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(“SCM”).129 The SCM limits the general permissibility of subsidies under the GATT and further 
defines which types of subsidies are to be permitted and prohibited.130 The SCM defines a 
subsidy as any (i) financial contribution, (ii) by a government within a member country, (iii) 
which confers a benefit.131 If a government action qualifies as a subsidy, the SCM prohibits the 
subsidy if, for example, it is “contingent . . . upon export performance.”132 The definition of 
export performance under the SCM is intentionally broad and includes cases where the facts 
demonstrate that the subsidy is “tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.”133  
The GATT refers to IP rights only briefly in one section.134 Understanding the need to 
provide minimum substantive legal protections for IP internationally, members of the WTO 
                                                          
125 Id. art. III:1. 
126 See generally id. art. III.  
127 Id. art. III:8(b). 
128 INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL, 2017 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS WITH TRADE 
AGREEMENTS pt. II at 15 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 REPORT].  
129 See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM]. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. art. I.  
132 Id. art. III:1(a).   
133 Id. n.4.  
134 GATT, supra note 127, art. XX:(d) (“[N]othing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . necessary to . . . [protect] patents, trade marks and copyrights 
. . . .”). 




developed the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS 
Agreement”).135 Under this agreement, countries agree to implement minimum standards for IP 
protection and enforcement.136 Among other types of IP, the TRIPS Agreement applies to both 
patents and trademarks.137  
Like the GATT, the TRIPS Agreement also requires adherence to the rule of national 
treatment.138 Under this principle, member countries are not permitted to treat member country 
nationals any less favorably than its own nationals with regard to IP protection.139 “Protection,” 
as it is defined in the TRIPS Agreement includes “the availability, acquisition, scope, 
maintenance, and enforcement of intellectual property rights . . . .”140 Put more simply, the 
national treatment clause in the TRIPS Agreement prohibits discrimination between nationals of 
a member’s own country and nationals of another member’s country in regards to securing or 
enforcing IP rights.141 This national treatment principle serves the important purpose of 
eliminating domestic barriers to IP protection between WTO members.142 Unlike the GATT, the 
TRIPS Agreement provides only for very limited and specific deviations from the national 
treatment rule.143 
B. Chinese IP Subsidies Under the SCM and TRIPS Agreements 
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China is a member of the WTO and is party to the GATT, SCM and TRIPS 
Agreements.144 Thus, under these agreements, China is required both to abide by the national 
treatment principle enunciated in the TRIPS Agreement and to refrain from providing prohibited 
subsidies under the SCM.145 In enacting its subsidies for patent and trademark applications 
domestic and abroad, China likely violates its obligations under both the SCM and the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
i. The SCM Agreement Violation 
By offering subsidies to Chinese applicants contingent on their acquisition of foreign IP 
rights, China likely violates article 3.1(a) of the SCM.146 
1.  The Chinese IP Subsidies Qualify as “Subsidies” under the SCM 
As noted before,147 Article 1.1 of the SCM defines a subsidy as a (i) financial 
contribution, (ii) by a government within a member country, (iii) which confers a benefit.148 
Here, the cash payments provided by the Chinese government to Chinese nationals for their 
acquisition of foreign IP rights qualify as subsidies. First, a financial contribution has been 
defined by WTO Appellate Bodies as a transfer of economic resources by the grantor.149 Here, 
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the cash payments provided to applicants by the Chinese government represent a transfer of 
economic resources, Chinese currency, by the grantor, the Chinese government.150 Second, many 
of the cash payments are offered by Chinese provincial governments,151 which are governments 
within China—a member country of the WTO.152 Third, the benefit provision of the SCM has 
been interpreted to require that a recipient receive a financial contribution on terms more 
favorable than the open market.153 Here, the cash payments from China render foreign IP filings 
by applicants receiving the payments cheaper than if they were to file from another country. 
Given that the Chinese payments meet the requirements under article 1.1 of the SCM, they 
qualify as subsidies under the agreement.  
 2. The Chinese Subsidies Are De Facto Export Subsidies  
Next, the subsidies provided by China to Chinese applicants filing abroad are prohibited 
under the SCM insofar as they are contingent on export performance.154 Such prohibited export  
subsidies may be either de jure export subsidies, or de facto export subsidies.155 De jure export 
subsidies occur when the subsidy is contingent in law on export performance, based on the words 
of the relevant legislation.156 De facto export subsidies, are inferred from the totality of the 
surrounding facts.157 The difference between de facto and de jure export subsidies has been 
described as “what evidence may be employed to prove that a subsidy is export contingent.”158 
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Here, the Chinese legislation only provides for subsidies where applicants seek or obtain foreign 
patent protection and does not explicitly require exportation of goods or services.159 Thus, the 
legislation alone would likely be insufficient evidence to prove that the subsidies are de jure 
export subsidies contingent on export performance.160 Instead, the Chinese subsidies should be 
analyzed under de facto export subsidy law and should be examined in light of the surrounding 
facts.  
3. The De Facto Export Subsidies Are Prohibited under Article 3.1(a) of the 
SCN 
This contingency requirement has been interpreted by the Canada—Aircraft Appellate 
Body to require that there be (i) a granting of a subsidy, (ii) that is tied to, (iii) anticipated export 
earnings.161 Regarding the Chinese subsidies, the first element is met, insofar as the Chinese 
government grants a subsidy by providing domestic applicants monetary payments that meet the 
requirements of Article I:1 of the SCM, as discussed above.  
Next, skipping to the third element, the subsidies were granted in anticipation of export 
earnings. The Appellate Body in Canada—Aircraft clarified that the “meaning of the word 
‘anticipated’ is ‘expected.’”162 Acquiring IP rights generally confers the exclusive rights to use, 
exclude, license, or sell using a particular trade name or technology within the granting 
country.163 In some cases, such as in the Amazon Brand Registry Program, US trademark owners 
even are given preferential treatment and exclusive promotion to customers.164 Although some 
IP rights may be more valuable than others, working the foreign patent or trademark can be 
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expected to provide financial earnings to the owner in the form of increased sales or profits.165 
These financial earnings may be derived from products exported from China, in which case the 
exports are driven by the underlying IP right.166 Thus, one could likely expect to incur such 
export earnings as a result of the patent or trademark protection, paid for by the Chinese subsidy.  
In Canada—Aircraft, the Panel also elaborated on the meaning of “export performance” 
by distinguishing “export performance” from “technological benefits to Canada.”167 In 
Canada—Aircraft, a project’s subsidy was conditioned on the technological benefits provided to 
Canada.168 The Panel acknowledged that some of the projects with higher technological and 
economic benefits may indeed yield an increase in an exports or export earnings.169 However, 
the technological benefits could not be considered synonymous with export performance, given 
that they lacked information for the grantors to select projects on the basis of export 
performance.170  
Although one might analogize these subsidies to the Chinese IP subsidies, the two are 
distinguishable. While the Canada—Aircraft subsidies were conditioned on technological 
benefits to Canada,171 the Chinese subsidies are conditioned on procurement of an IP right in the 
US.172 Utilization of the technological benefits to Canada may or may not result in increased 
export performance.173 The technological benefits could be retained solely within Canada and 
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provide for the benefit to Canada without ever being exported. Thus, the technological benefits 
to Canada have independent value aside from their export potential. Working the foreign-owned 
US IP right, on the other hand, results in export earnings from increased sales generated by the 
competitive advantage conferred by the US IP right. Unlike the technological benefits to Canada, 
these foreign IP rights generally lack any value aside from the competitive advantage they 
provide in the US marketplace.174 Whereas Canada sought to subsidize anything providing 
technological benefits to itself, regardless of whether it is exported, under this measure, China 
only subsidizes procurement of the competitive advantage, in the form of an IP right, in the US. 
By only subsidizing the procurement of this increased ability to compete in the US marketplace, 
China effectively only “select[s] projects on the basis of increased export performance.”175  
Admittedly, a strong counterargument exists to the contention that the procurement of US 
IP rights can be synonymous with export performance. The argument here would be that 
regardless of whether the IP right turns out to be profitable and therefore actually leads to export 
performance, the subsidy for its procurement is still granted. Thus, because there is no penalty or 
revocation of the subsidy for failing to profitably work the IP right, in some cases, the subsidy 
would be granted despite the lack of any export performance. This argument has been considered 
and rejected by at least one WTO Panel.176 Although the Panel agreed that the argument had 
merit regarding actual export earnings, the argument fails to rebut the prima facie showing that a 
subsidy would not have been granted but for anticipated export earnings.177 Thus, because 
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Chinese subsidized IP rights yield anticipated export earnings, the fact that they do not penalize 
applicants who’s rights do not ultimately produce export profits is not fatal to this analysis.  
Another potential counterargument may be that a Chinese owner of a US IP right need 
not necessarily produce the protected product in China. They could have the product made in the 
US and collect earnings on the product without ever having exported it into the US. This 
argument fails for two reasons. The first is a practical point. Comparatively speaking, Chinese 
manufacturing costs are significantly lower than the US.178 It is one of the reasons that China has 
been coined “the world’s factory.”179 Moving manufacturing operations outside of China would 
likely be economically irrational for these Chinese owners of US IP rights.180 Second, the mere 
fact that some of the subsidized products are manufactured abroad “does not dissolve the export 
contingency arising in the first set of circumstances[]”–domestic production and subsequent 
exportation.181 Even if some protected products were manufactured outside of China, under this 
holding, the Chinese acquisition of US IP rights can still be considered synonymous with export 
performance.  
Finally, the second element, whether the subsidy is tied to the export earnings, likely 
applies to the Chinese IP subsidies. The Canada—Aircraft Panel elaborated on this element, 
stating that the nature of the required conditionality is that “one of the conditions for the grant of 
the subsidy is the expectation that exports will flow thereby.”182 In ascertaining whether the 
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subsidy is tied to the anticipated exportation, the Appellate Body in EC and Certain Member 
States—Large Civil Aircraft, established the export inducement test, clarifying that export 
contingency must be inferred from factors including the: “(i) design and structure of the measure 
granting the subsidy, (ii) the modalities of operation set out in such a measure, and (iii) the 
relevant factual circumstances surrounding the granting of the subsidy that provide the context 
for understanding the measure’s design, structure, and modalities of operation.”183 Various 
Panels and Appellate Bodies have found different factors relevant in this analysis. One such 
factor is the ratios test, wherein the ratio of export earnings with the subsidy is compared to the 
situation without the subsidy.184  
As noted in previous sections, the Chinese government provides cash rewards for the 
successful granting of IP rights. For example, at least one of the cash reward subsidies states that 
“[a]pplicants who have obtained invention patents from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office . . . will receive a grant of 40,000 yuan each.”185 Here, the measure enacting the subsidy is 
designed and structured so that the provision of the subsidy is explicitly contingent on the 
condition that an applicant have obtained a US invention patent. As discussed in above, IP rights, 
such as patent rights, confer an expectation of export earnings. Thus, the measure here is 
structured so that the provision of the subsidy is explicitly conditioned upon expected export 
earnings.  
Next, the modality of operation of the subsidy is similarly simple. In practice, Chinese 
applicants who obtain a US patent are eligible for a 40,000 yuan subsidy.186 Those who do not 
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obtain a US patent are not eligible.187 To apply for the subsidy, applicants need only submit an 
application form, qualification materials, receipts, and the patent certificate.188 Although there 
are certain limits on the number of subsidies applicants are eligible for within a given year, until 
they reach that amount, applicants are free to obtain this subsidy.189 No entities may secure this 
subsidy without securing the US patent right.190 Thus, the actual operation of the subsidy works 
to condition the subsidy on the anticipated export earnings.  
Finally, the factual circumstances surrounding the grant of the subsidy indicate that it is 
tied to export earnings. Over the past 15 years the Chinese subsidies have been in force, Chinese 
exports have increased by approximately two hundred percent.191 To be clear, there are likely 
many other causes for this increase in exportation, but still, under the ratios analysis this sort of 
circumstantial evidence may support that the subsidies are tied to export earnings.  
Because the Chinese subsidies meet the definition of a “subsidy” under the SCM and are 
contingent on export performance, Chinese subsidies granting payment to Chinese applicants 
who successfully secure IP protection in the US are likely prohibited under the SCM.  
ii. The TRIPS Agreement Violation 
It is unlikely that Chinese subsidies to Chinese nationals applying for domestic IP rights 
would be classified as prohibited export contingent subsidies under the SCM. This is because the 
domestic IP right would likely not be sufficiently “tied to” anticipated export earnings, or 
because the domestic IP right would not be considered synonymous with “export earnings”. 
However, by providing subsidies for Chinese nationals applying these domestic IP rights, China 
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likely violates its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. As noted above, under both the 
GATT and TRIPS Agreements, member countries must abide by the principle of national 
treatment.192 The GATT defines national treatment specifically as it relates to the imposition of 
trade barriers.193 The GATT, however, lists domestic subsidies provided to domestic entities as 
exceptions to the requirement that countries do not discriminate between foreign and domestic 
entities in their imposition of trade barriers.194 In carving out domestic subsidies, the GATT 
allows countries to discriminate between foreign and domestic entities in granting subsidies and 
implicitly acknowledges that such domestic subsidies generally violate the principle of national 
treatment.  
The TRIPS Agreement defines additional rules, that add to “the basic principles of GATT 
1994 and . . . relevant international intellectual property agreements[.]”195 The TRIPS Agreement 
defines and requires national treatment specifically as it relates to the acquisition and 
enforcement of IP rights.196 Because it serves as a separate additional agreement, the national 
treatment rules enunciated in the TRIPS Agreement do not merely restate those of the GATT but 
provide for enhanced level of IP protection.197 Unlike the GATT, the TRIPS Agreement does not 
contain a domestic subsidy exception to the national treatment rule.198  Thus, it would seem that 
for acquisitions of IP, domestic subsidies provided to domestic citizens violate the rule of 
national treatment promulgated by the TRIPS Agreement.  
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Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows consideration of 
“an agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty.”199 The GATT is “an agreement relating to the [TRIPS Agreement] 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the [TRIPS Agreement]” and 
therefore, may be considered in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.200 As noted above, the 
GATT proclaims the national treatment principle but includes a specific exception to immunize 
domestic subsidies from being held as violations of the principle of national treatment.201 The 
TRIPS Agreement, while also proclaiming the principle of national treatment, does not include 
any exceptions that immunize domestic subsidies offered in violation of this principle.202 
Therefore, by including a national treatment exception for subsidies in the GATT, which pertains 
to goods, but not in the TRIPS Agreement, which pertains to IP, it seems as though subsidies for 
the acquisition of IP rights are not exempted from the national treatment principle in the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
As noted above, the Chinese government currently provides subsidies to Chinese 
nationals for their application for or acquisition of patent and trademark rights in China.203 These 
subsidies do not appear to be available to non-Chinese applicants.204 The national treatment rules 
of the TRIPS Agreement prohibit discrimination between national and foreign applicants seeking 
to secure IP protection in a member country.205 Providing subsidies to Chinese patent and 
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trademark applicants while denying them to non-Chinese applicants involves discriminating 
between applicants based on their nationality. Thus, the subsidies provided to the Chinese 
nationals, which make acquiring Chinese IP rights more expensive for foreign applicants than 
domestic applicants, violate the national treatment principles of the TRIPS Agreement.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Chinese applications for patents and trademarks have exploded in number over the past 
ten years.206 To some degree, this increase in filings can be attributed to subsidy programs 
offered to domestic applicants by the Chinese government.207 These subsidies, offered for 
foreign and domestic IP acquisitions, have legitimate and profound international 
consequences.208 Domestic solutions to these issues would likely require the expenditure of 
additional resources from the US or other affected countries. However, by sponsoring these 
subsidy programs, China disobeys national treatment principles enacted under the TRIPS 
Agreement and disregards its obligations under the SCM.209 Thus, WTO members should seek to 
enforce these agreements to curb China’s continued violations.  
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